Saturday, May 29, 2021

Paper "Toward a New Community Resilience Understanding: The Findhorn Ecovillage Case"

Here I share with you my paper published by the "Sustainable Communities Review" academic journal (Volume 14, Issue 1 [2021]), in which I propose a new definition and understanding of the "Community Resilience" concept.


Link:

http://scrjournal.org/SCR%20Spring%202021/Community%20Resilence_Vicente.pdf?fbclid=IwAR0y9DArDWve2nHy3gxMAzLkle4xTmhymc-tV8UiZEkofSgua6gNp2VtG0o

COMMUNITY RESILIENCE

"Social and institutional capacities to adapt, resist, or avoid external shocks that threaten the economic and ontological security of community members" (p.29). 



Saturday, February 8, 2020

Organizational Vectors Theory



Here I share a brief explanation of the Sociological "Theory of the Organizational Vectors"; a theory that I created based on my undergraduate thesis research called "ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS OF A CHILEAN ECOVILLAGE: THE "X COMMUNITY" CASE".



Graphic representation of the organizational vectors

GRAPHIC EXPLANATION:

VARIABLES:

HIERARCHIZATION (Z) From “community” till “society”.
REGULATION (X) From “anomic” till “fatalist”.
INTEGRATION (Y) From “egoistic” to “altruist”.
LAW (D) Continuous “repressive”-“restorative”.
INDIVIDUATION (i) d axis (from “i-” to “i+”).
SOCIAL DIVISION OF WORK (T) y axis (from “T-” to “T+”).


Do not confound axis “x”, “y”, “z”, “d”, with variables “X”, “Y”, “Z”, “D”.

ORGANIZATIONAL CATEGORIES: mechanic community, organic community, mechanic society, organic society, are situated as reference points for the rest of (concrete) social types with their respective forms of social organization.

EXTREMES: community-society, anomic-fatalist, egoistic-altruist, repressive-restorative.

The extremes of all axis have its inflection point in the “optimum point” (where all the axis crossed each other).

The increase of mechanic solidarity diminishes organic solidarity; that is it increases REGULATION and repressive LAW (Drp), diminishing INDIVIDUATION. The increment of organic solidarity decreases mechanic solidarity; that is to say, it increases SOCIAL DIVISION OF WORK but also restorative LAW (Drs), rising INDIVIDUATION. “LIBERTY” moves in axis “x”, while “SECURITY” in axis “y”. Both reach the maximum harmony in the “optimum point”, being the extreme the points less desirable.


THEORETICAL EXPLANATION:


The Organizational Vectors theory tries to give a clear graphic representation where to put the diverse forms of social organization. Thanks to the integrations of variables such as Hierarchization, it allows to identify different modes of organization, such as community and society, avoiding this way mistakes in terms. Considering all variables, the graphic facilitates the ubication of concrete types of organization, allowing to compare different social types, according to their differences in organization.


From the combinations of variables emerges 4 organizational types, which would be determined by the Hierarchization and the types of solidarity. We see that mechanic solidarity would rule the Regulation of different social types and the organic solidarity the Integration. While organic solidarity increases meanwhile it gets closer to the egoistic pathology (the problem of the modern liberal societies found by Durkheim), the mechanic solidarity reaches its maximum in the fatalist pathology (the collectivist repression, so feared by the liberalism).


In the case of the variable “LAW” (D), due to having a double-sense flux, it indicates that the right superior part (quadrant II) the repressive law gets till a maximum (fascist dictatorship), that is to say, the absolute repression in the hand of a dictator. In the opposite case, the restorative law gets its maximum with the “anarcho-liberalist” dystopia, where each one “charges” the law “according their own hands” (caricaturized in the famous Italian “vendetta”).


We will see with more detail now, the 4 "pathological extremes" (the dystopias).


From the “pure” community, where is no Hierarchization (maximum horizontality), this grows to reach to the most fatalist and egoistic society, that is, where the Regulation is maximum and the Integration minimum. To this state, as dystopian ideal type, it can be named “Anarcho-capitalist Dystopia”. As we know, the anarcho-capitalism promotes a free-market economy without the presence of the state. This way, the accumulation of the great capitalists would allow to make their will (regulate as they want), producing a competition (not-cooperation or not-integration) without-ending by the private resources, bringing this fight state to a egoistic pathology of disintegration, where individuals would not worry at all about each other, however, being regulated by the capitalist “feudal seigniors”, which could make their will without limitation more than the “free” rejection (to the contract), by part of the hungry unemployed.


Starting from the previous conditions (maximum egoism and fatalism), but diminishing the organic solidarity to the maximum, we come into an altruist-fatalist pathological state. An example of this is the Fascist Dystopia, where Regulation is so strong, that -strongly integrated- individuals submit to it, to the level of being available to die “for the Führer”. In the case of the Nazi Germany, with its post Hitler’s death suicides, it is an example of this state.


Now, if we diminish to the maximum the mechanic solidarity and we increased to the maximum the organic solidarity, we found that the individuals, although they do not have Regulation at all, neither they are Integrated at all. Thus, the “Anarcho-Liberalist” Dystopia manifests; the “absolute” chaos, “lack of laws”, derivate in what the mass media understand by “anarchy”: a state of violence where nobody respects each other and everybody does what they wish without having any consideration for the other. Therefore, a state of maximum anomy (lack of laws) and egoism, where Homō hominī lupus est (“a man is a wolf to another man”). It was given the appellative of “Liberalist” in honor to the tremendous and effective efforts that Liberalism has done (from its triumph in the French Revolution) to dislike, denigrate, tergiversate and manipulate the concept of “anarchy”, signifying it this way as the absolute chaotic state, reaching therefore its hegemonic objective: to associate the concept of anarchy to the more undesirable state.


Now if we diminish to the maximum the organic solidarity but we also diminish to the maximum Hierarchization, we arrived to a state of excessive Integration but not regulated in any way. This way, we glimpse the Anarcho-Communist Dystopia, i.e., where the excessively integrated collective “suffocates” the individual, to the level that this last one seems to not have “voice nor vote”. This way is produced the “tyranny of the majority”, censuring any individual feat that endangers the collective.


Besides these dangerous extremes, we can find intermediate states. For example, as it was mentioned in the thesis, the X ecovillage enjoys an Integration state quite “healthy” (which makes it to be close to the x axis). However, it has a tendency to the anomy, probably due to its aversion to (juridical) laws and a profound love for liberty, which makes this one to tend to the libertinage (lack of norms and order). Nonetheless, it is not an extreme tendency, therefore The X Community might be situated between the middle of the anomy and the optimum point of Regulation.


On the other hand, we can find the case of a very Liberal Capitalist state. Being liberal, it has some concern about the Regulation, appealing for that to the laws of the state. Notwithstanding, the excess of Individuation (as in the case of the US society) brings to an excess of organic solidarity, which produces egoistic disintegration (which is reflected in the delinquency states o the multiple murders of school students by part of classmates that suffered “Bullying”).


In contraposition to the Liberal state, the Marxist state mainly regulates by a strong mechanic solidarity. Therefore, the excess of Regulation produces a fatalist state. Even though the integration is relatively close to the harmony (x axis), due to the solid sociopolitical ideals (which brings a common identity) and the potential external -capitalist- threat (threat that as it is well known by the militaries and politicians, it generates social cohesion), the Integration is not “perfect”. This could be exemplified in the case of the Stalin state, by the forced peasant migration to work in inhospitable territory. In the case of more altruist societies (such as for example the Hitlerian Nazi state) probably that work would have done “at will” (as a “sacrifice” in post of Germany). However, because of not reaching that excess of altruism, the Russian individual resisted to be moved (therefore had to be forced to that). Nevertheless, the optimum Integration state tends to a higher Individuation, that is to say, towards greater liberty (of the individual to choose his way of life).


If that Marxist society would regulate in a “healthier” way (in not such excessive way, decreasing its mechanic solidarity, or, which would be the same, increasing its organic solidarity) and at the same time, would augment the level of Integration in an excessive way, it might reach a similar state to the (old) Tibetan Theocracy: a Hierarchic state (society), quite well Regulated (close to the y axis) -due to its solid and accepted religious structure-, but excessively Integrated (far away from the x axis) -due to the negative Buddhist notions about the ego or individual personality-.


Lastly, it should be noted that, (graphically) the (variable) Social Division of Work, as minimum agreement between individuals, situates in the optimum point of Regulation (y axis). Therefore, keeping a constant Regulation, while the individual became excessively individualist (excess of Individuation), the Social Division of Work gets to a maximum (organic society), producing a Regulated work, but extremely egoistic (which is reflected in our Capitalist Organic Societies, where economic inequality -product of disintegration- is abysmal). Thence Durkheim, intuitively wanted to solve the problem of modern (dis)Integration (excess of organic solidarity) increasing the power (Regulation) of the unions, which would serve as intermediate regulative entities (between the individuals and the state); which basically was proposed by Durkheim -interpreted from the language of the graphic representation of the organizational vectors- was to increase the mechanic solidarity (syndicate Regulation), to this way, diminish the organic solidarity, and therefore, to make western societies to tend more towards an optimum Integration, drawing away of the egoistic (dis)Integration (in this sense, the “Durkheimian union” did not look so much to regulate, but this regulation has as goal to integrate).


In the opposite case of the previous paragraph, if the individual is excessively altruist (lack of Individuation), it will happen the minimum Social Division of Work, that is to say, the mechanic community (what Durkheim understood as “primitive societies”). In this variable, as in all the mentioned, the optimum point is the middle point. There, when the Regulation and Integration were in their optimal state, the work would not only be coordinated (regulated), but also it would be perfectly integrated.


Although the optimum point could be interpreted as an utopian ideal of harmony, it will serve as a reference axis to characterize the diverse forms or social organization, identifying them within a graphic that will permit to visualize and compare the different social types, classifying them, according to the (vector) variables considered.

Community and Society: A new definition




There is no doubt that the theoretical and conceptual clarity is an important when undertaking a project or guiding the action. On the contrary, confusion will deviate the original purpose or it will confuse with other ones antagonistic. That has been the case, in the history of the last centuries, what have occurred with the concepts of "Community" and "Society".

Once that the Liberal Revolution (French and Industrial Revolution) triumphed, it systematically dedicated to completely obliterate its political enemies. Among them, one of the less noted was the old agricultural communities. These communities, were HORIZONTAL forms of organization, where nobody had more power than the rest, and where the relationships were of primary order, that is to say "face-to-face" and affective, as it is on families.

Even the academic history, such as is the case of sociology, has made efforts to diffuse, eliminate or to make ambiguous the communal way of life. This way, people would not know anymore about the existence of such way of social organization, thinking that the only one possible is the present one, which it is the one of Society. Society, in few words, is the HIERARCHICAL way of social organization based on COMPETITION, that has INSTRUMENTAL social relationships (the other one is a mean to satisfy my end).

This, with my thesis I try to revindicate a conceptual distinction to have clear that community is not a "diffuse form" that is not fully understood; nor a amorphous thing within the society... By the contrary, it has clear and defined characteristics that distinguish it of societies, which have been the ones who have written our history. That is to say, my intention is to show the differences between those ways of organization, differences that have not been considered till now by the academy (or that it has been deliberatively hidden for political purposes).

I shared thence, extracts of my Sociological Thesis:

"The idea of community has been one of the most interest for the sociological analysis. From the origins of sociology, in the XIXth century, different authors (Durkheim, 1893/2011; Marx, 1867/2010; Tönnies, 1887/1947; Weber, 1922/2012) have theorized about it.

it was Tönnies (1887/1947) who showed more openly to the social study disciplines the conceptual scission between community (gemeinschaft) and society (gesellschaft). Community seen from this perspective would be a good itself, due to the virtues that this would possess: to give security to the individual, offer relationships that characterize for being close, personal and affective; here individuals “keep together besides all separations” (p.65). Hence, for Tönnies community is the moral place par excellence, virtue headquarters (Nisbet, 2010).

Contrarily, society concept (which is the new in contraposition to the antique communal) would characterize for the high grade of individualism and impersonality on relationships (due to contractualism[1]). Its main character would be then to be structured on the calculus (instrumental rationality) and selfish individual interest. That is why “in society [individuals] keep separated beyond all unions” (Tönnies, 1887/1947: 65). As it can be glimpsed on Tönnies’ version, he proposed to highlight the negative effects of modernity: the loss of social cohesion and affectivity among relationships. That is why often he is catalogued as a romantic, due to its nostalgy of the benevolent past (Nisbet, 2010).

But the classical gemeinschaft-gesellschaft conceptualization did not remain always with the same signification that had in its original author. One of the first critics was Émile Durkheim. In The Division of Labour in Society (1893/2011) he assumes on a first glance a similar conception than Tönnies -mainly on which refers to society description- (Schluchter, 2011), in the sense that there is an important break between old and modern societies. For this Durkheim analyses the principal characteristics of each one: it is the solidarity type which distinguish current societies from old ones. On primitive societies (what are understood by Tönnies as community) the active type of solidarity would be mechanic solidarity. This would refer to the social cohesion based on similarities. As within primitive societies would be a tendency to the homogenization of believes, representations and social practices among individuals of the same community, there would be few possibilities to get into conflicts, because of there would be a common sense that would guide all individual to the same social purpose[2]. But with the advance of the division of social work differences were accentuating each time more. The prevailing modern individualism would find a new type of solidarity, organic solidarity. As work is divided is convenient that there is difference: what a worker does not make, he buys to another worker that does it. This way the tendency of differentiation in the division of social work and consume would enhance cohesion in modern societies. What is important to highlight here is that from this interpretation a positive idea of modern society arises. In Durkheim, differently from Tönnies, modern individualism (because of its job specialization) would ward off social disintegration. Moreover (as it would be seen later), mechanic solidarity characteristics (homogenization, repressive right) would have several undesirable qualities for the modern subject.

It was not only Durkheim who distance himself from Tönnies. Max Weber also did. Being coherent with his methodological individualism, Weber centered on social action, diluting the original dichotomy between gemeinschaft and gesellschaft, although it can be noted the influence of it. On this Nisbet (2010) points out:

We have the effect of Tönnies’ typology over the way that Weber examines the nature of social action and social relationships. Weber’s framework is more subtle and, as a whole, more complete, but its roots on the distinction that the former established between the two types of association are at sight.

We clearly see this on the notable Weberian characterization of the four types of social action, oriented respectively: 1) To interpersonal ends, 2) towards absolute valued goals, 3) toward emotional or affective states, and 4) unto the traditional and conventional. Let’s concede that Weber classification is superior; anyhow, his link with Tönnies’ distinction between the two types of volition, and between social norms and values, results incontestable. (p.111, own italics)

Weber would outstrip therefore -in Nisbet opinion- Tönnies’ theorizations. It is important to foreground this lack of transcendence on which Tönnies theory fell. It seems that other conceptualizations were getting more importance on Academy, turning each time community-society concepts more diffuse. For example, although the definitions made, on Weber (1922/2012) himself it can be found some polysemy on community concept: domestic, local, economic, ethnic, religious, political, they are all forms of community. This diffuse use of community seems to be installed on social sciences, to the level that nowadays it is used as synonym of multiple words (to refer from a locality[3], race, a nation or even the whole word, to civil organizations[4]). About this, Hobsbawm (in Bauman, 2004) reflects: “the word ’community’ never was used in such a indiscriminative and void way as on the decades where it was very difficult to find on real life true communities, in the sociological way” (p.182); that is to say, on modern times, where industrial societies dulled communities almost till extinction.

Besides the distention of the Tönnies’ original community concept, this term also has been criticised from a semantic viewpoint. Contemporary Bauman (2003) has pointed out that, even though community gives a positive impression, deep down there is a price to live in it. The cost is the constant trade-off between security and liberty, which to Bauman, are inversely proportional concepts, therefore if one increases, the other would decrease. On community what would be won in security, would be lost on liberty. The previous can be understood recapitulating Durkheim (1893/2011). Mechanic solidarity (according to mainstream sociology is the one that rules communities[5]), which is based on similarities, has repressive sanction, where individual is highly limited to fit on the collective similarity.

Similar to Bauman’s analysis, Touraine (1997, 1998) drafts the danger of valuating the individual only by its belonging to community. This cultural fragmentation would lead us to a world of cults and the rejection of any social norm (because communities would often define themselves in a defensive way, as victim-groups against an omni-encompassing system, which would be seen itself as perverse). Furthermore, the obsession of purity and homogeneity obsession that characterises communal spirit (which would distance itself from instrumental rationality), would impulse communities to fall on authoritarian leaderships (examples of this, according to Touraine, would be Nazi Germany or the Islamic countries…).

Although practically all Bauman’s book Community: Seeking Safety in an Insecure World is sustained by security and freedom notions, in any place those concepts are defined. We can find the same ambiguity on classical theoretical sociologist (Tönnies, 1887/1947; Durkheim, 1893/2011), although it is important to point out that their works have rather an implicit than explicit relationship with those terms. Similarly, works related to community, made by contemporaries philosophers (such as Esposito, 2003), though they might significantly enrich social theory, they might not seem to be enough for a strict sociological conceptualization, since as Bortz (in Flick, 2007) exposes, the ideas of philosophical content do not explicitly fit with the empirical purpose of social sciences. That is why, though a priori some temporary definitions are suggested, we would constantly keep the reflective attitude of qualitative research (Hernández, 2014), being open to the possibility of making new conceptualizations based on the empirical data (Flick, 2007).

Nonetheless, there are general notions about all conceptualization of community. For instance, community tend to be related to the common elements shared by some individuals. At this respect, Concha (2010) points out: “Community is a group of beings that shared common elements, either material elements (as body and other possessions, relating this way with consumption) as social categories of perception and interpretation[6] of reality” (p.21).

This common element, besides being express on believes, it would be mainly sustained on feeling. Thus, community is a way of organization that generates an especial type of communion, that is to say, it is a form of social organization that involves feelings between its members. As Max Weber (1922/2012) mentions:

We call community to a social relationship when and as far the attitude in the social action -in this particular case, for middle term or in the pure type- is inspired on the subjective feeling (affective or traditional) of the participants on constituting a whole. (p.33)

In contrast:

We call society to a social relationship when and as far the attitude on the social action is inspired on a compensation of interests for rational motives (of ends or values) or also to a union of interest with the same motivation. Society, as a typical mode, can especially lie (but not only) on a rational agreement or pact, for reciprocal declaration. Then the action, when is rational, is orientated to a) Rational according to values: on merits to the belief of the same vinculation; b) Rational according to ends: for the expectative of loyalty of the other part. (p.33)
Therefore, it could be said that while community is based mainly on feeling[7], society does on rationality, though it should be always kept present that, as ideal types they are not absolutely exclusive, but “the great majority of social relationships participate in part of the ‘community’ and in part of ‘society’” (Weber, 1922/2012, p.33).

Roberto Esposito (2003) deepens the semantic critic to the community concept. For this philosopher the concept of community has often been used as “an attribute, a determination, a predicate that classifies them [the subjects] as belonging to the same set. Or even as a ‘substance’ produced by their union” (p.22). This way he criticizes the sense of wholeness and essentiality of the community concept, marking off its darker aspects. Through a complete semantic analysis of the term, Esposito got to the conclusion that on its origins communitas would rather represent something related to duty:

The munus that the communitas share is not a property or a membership. It is not a possession, but, for the contrary, a debt, a pledge, a gift-to-give. And is therefore what is going to determine, what is to become, what virtually already is, a fault. A “duty” links the subjects of community -in the way that “I owe you something”, but not “you owe me something”-, that makes them to not be completely master of themselves. In more precise terms, it expropriates them, in part or completely, of their original property, their most characteristic property, that is to say, their subjectivity. (pp. 30-31)

Even though differentiation and stratification have been permanent processes of interest to sociologists (Hall, 1982), the free-thinker Gabriel Zavando (2011) points out that this problem transcends the sociological research field; being resolved with clarity with hundreds of examples of concrete communities, when they are analysed from the anthropological works. Zavando states that human being is a communitarian animal for nature and therefore, the one that lives in societies is equivalent to an animal that lives in captivity, is worth to say, a being that would lose the basic qualities that allow him to be part of the body that we call his specie. The problem with sociology would be that it would be taking as a object of study a mass of human beings that literally has lost their basic human qualities, precisely because they have isolated themselves from each other, being reduced to a multitude of loose atoms but piled up on big masses; trying to analyse them as they were a group when in reality that would be precisely what they have lost, which would make impossible an accurate characterization of them. What characterizes a society would be, precisely, that it is a mass without own identity, that is why all identity that is pretended to be given to the individuals, in reality would be given by who characterizes them from outside; nations, social classes, religions, which would not be therefore, identities constructed from themselves. For this intellectual, the dichotomy between individual and human collective would be fallacious, that is why it would only be possible to speak about human groups when we talk about communities; he foregrounds the Ubuntu philosophy (‘I am because we are’) and explains that the dynamics of mutually reinforcing interactions that are given among a human group would be precisely what would constitute them as group, so that if we refer to individuals in competition (as happens in society), it could not be talked of group and analyse them as they were would be a basic conceptual mistake in which -according to Zavando- sociology falls. To sustain these arguments, he works from systems theory paradigm and he defines four differences between what we should understand for community and society: differences of structure, cosmovision, organization and dynamics. For example, meanwhile community would mainly have a horizontal structure and a cooperative organization, society would have a pyramidal structure (hierarchical) and a competitive organization.

To those theorizations, the present research adds up one distinction more: meanwhile the decision-making on the social organization of a modern society (that is to say, one based on the power of the state and the bureaucratic administration; Weber, 1922/2012) would be principally sustained on the instrumental rationality according to ends (that is, that which usually instrumentalizes individuals as just statistical numbers), the decision-making of community would be characterized by a communicative rationality (Habermas, 1992), i.e., the one that has as goal to find agreements between the implicated people, through a transparent and direct dialogue.

Taking into account the above, for “society”, it will be understood then:

Hierarchic mode of organization mainly based on instrumental rationality according to ends, with a competitive ethic that records agreements through formal and written proceedings using the juridical violence logic.

For juridical violence logic is understood all the processes of decision-making based on an oligarchic center of power, where members hold positions of political power, acting according to idealism, self interest or class consciousness, privileging a specific population sector, being another sector disadvantaged in great or less degree as direct or indirect consequence of those decisions.

In contrast, by “community”, would therefore be understood:
A horizontal organizational mode mainly based on emotional connections, that generates a sensation of unity between its members, with a cooperative ethic that registers its agreements tacitly through the communicative rationality logic.

For communicative rationality logic it is understood all the decision-making processes are based on face-to-face relationships, where all the members participate equally in decision-making processes, having all interests in common, that is to say, acting with purpose unity and the intentionality of getting mutual consensus, resulting in agreements."

[1] By contractualism is understood the typical form of relating in the modern societies: through legal contracts. This form of relating each other, naturalized by the iusnaturalists of the illuminist period, have not been always like that, as it was deduced from the sociological contributions about primitive societies (Tönnies, 1887/1947 and Durkheim, 1893/2011, 1912/1995). For example, from Weber (1922/2012), it can be understood that the concept of community from Tönnies would be associated to a traditional domination, while the concept of society, to the bureaucratic-rational domination.

[2] Far from idealizing the primitive communities (considering them as pacific entities), it is important to foreground that the cohesion would be internal. As it follows from the anthropological contributions of Pierre Clastres, “the war is a structure of the primitive society” (in Gayubas, 2010: 2), in the sense that it is useful for the self-affirmation of the own community, which would need an enemy otherness (foreigner communities) to create an indivisible and solid identity tie.

[3] Such as in Hall (1982).

[4] See León (2013), Las organizaciones civiles como un ejemplo de comunidad [civil organizations as an example of community].

[5] Effectively, lots -if not most- of the sociological works (Bauman, 2003; Touraine, 1997; Weber, 1922/2012, among others) tend to associate the community with a social organization with homogenous values and a strong social cohesion. In addition, it would be strongly repressive against individual freedom. That is to say, they tend to associate communities -deliberately or unconsciously- to the characteristics of the mechanic solidarity.

[6] This categories of perception and interpretation would be the ones that would allow to reduce -in part- the complexity of the modern world, letting this way, some level of security. To more information, see the next section (Security and liberty).

[7] It is important to stand out that it is not any type of feeling, but that is a reciprocal referred feeling, that is traduced in a joint organization, that is to say, in individuals that form a whole; that is, a unity (Weber, 1922/2012). At this regard Concha (2010) states that:

The identity of the community, in all its complexity and variability, must be able to integrate the multiplicity into            a coherent self. In order that this happens a binder that generates cohesion in the group is needed, be a common remote past, a conjunction of qualities with which the group feels imitatively connected and/or an ideal or vision of future (p.21).

Friday, January 31, 2020

Livelihood options in the Findhorn Ecovillage (Scotland)

Here I share the link where you can read or download the dissertation that allowed me to graduate as a Master in Science in Ecological Economics



shorturl.at/nDKZ0

Abstract


Ecovillages are communities that aim to live in a sustainable, resilient way. Since their formal origins in the 1990s, when the concept was formally coined, several studies have shown their ecological benefits. However, there is a lack of research about the economic dynamics of these modern settlements. The present study aims to contribute to the knowledge of the economics of ecovillages by researching the livelihood options of its members and how capable they are to generate enough resources to create a community resilient environment. For this motive, one of the most famous and long-lived ecovillages in the world, Findhorn Ecovillage, was used as a case study. Eleven interviews were applied, trying to understand the overall economic situation of Findhorn Ecovillage’s members. Results indicate that, while basic needs are successfully met and there is high job satisfaction, the feeling of members about their economic situation, especially regarding secondary needs, is ambiguous. Also, the youngest interviewees have uncertainties about their financial future. On the other hand, the worldview of the members shows a lack of financial ambition and monetary goals.  Theirs is a philosophy of voluntary simplicity. In this way, the presence of social capital seems to counteract the deficiency of financial richness, as a source of well-being and community resilience. The research concludes with new understandings of communal resilience and with potential ways to enhance it. 

Key words: community resilience, ecovillages, Findhorn Ecovillage, social capital, voluntary simplicity. 


The aim of this paper was to:

·         document livelihood options of the FE members to understand better community resilience and the economies of ecovillages; and with this,

·         contribute to fill in the present literature gap, addressing ecovillage economics and its relationship with community resilience; to secondarily,

·         offer valuable information to new ecovillage projects.

The main research question of this study is:

1.       How successfully have ecovillages a resilient community environment?

And the secondary research questions are:

2.       What are the main personal economic choices and the general worldview that members have about their economic lifestyle?

3.       How comfortable are members with their current economic situation?

4.       What are the main income sources of the members? Do they depend mainly of jobs inside or outside the community?

5.       Are there some benefits, either financial, intangible or subjective, that come with living inside the ecovillage? If so, what are they?

Lastly, for the ones that want to take a brief look without download it, I share you the Introduction of the dissertation, as also the Contents (Index), besides a concept created:

Introduction

1.1. Contextualization and justification

To keep the economic engine working, growing economies tend to encourage the culture of consumerism. Jackson (2009, p.99) expresses that this materialist culture can even act as a “substitute for religion consolation.” In modern societies, consumerism and merchandise function as identification. The upper classes try to differentiate themselves from the rest, which, according to the Veblen's (1899) “conspicuous theory”, are constantly trying to imitate the former. For Jackson (2009) this creates an “Iron Cage of Consumerism”, based on anxiety:

Materialistic values such as popularity, image and financial success are psychologically opposed to ‘intrinsic’ values like self-acceptance, affiliation, a sense of belonging in the community … People with higher intrinsic values are both happier and have higher levels of environmental responsibility than those with materialistic values. (pp.148-149)

After realizing that there is a threshold in which more GDP per capita growth does not increase happiness, Dietz and O’Neill (2013, p.163) recommended that to achieve a steady state economy[1], consumerism should be replaced with nonmaterialistic lifestyles. One example that presents such a lifestyle shift are ecovillages (Dietz and O’Neill, 2013, p.164). They are offered as an alternative to individualistic and consumerist systems (Andreas and Wagner, 2012) and even as a “third political way”, different from capitalism and communism (Gilman et al., 1995).

These modern settlements has been identified as a source of inspiration in a transition to a sustainable society (Accioly Dias et al., 2017) and how a “degrowth world” would look like (Cattaneo, 2015). The latest philosophy, which aims to overcome perpetual economic growth, may be one of the main theoretical and practical products of the strong sustainability viewpoint. This approach, differently from the weak sustainability one, claim that natural capital[2] is not replaceable for other kinds of capital. According to Gowdy (2014), ecological economics represents the strong approach, whereas neoclassical economics represents the weak. Raworth (2017) adds that whereas neoclassical economics focuses on an individualist methodological approach, ecological economics is based on a systemic paradigm. Understanding practical and concrete cases of those sustainability paradigms might be useful to cope with the current ecological crisis and its potential solutions. Socio-ecological systems not only need to mitigate harmful ecological practices to ameliorate global warming, but they should also adapt to potential changes (IPCC, 2014) – community resilience is an indicator of the social sustainability which facilitates adaptation to stressors (Magis, 2010).

Ecovillages try to deal with the global crisis not in an individualist but in a systemic way. This systemic view is supposed to be exhibited through three dimensions: ecological, cultural-spiritual and social-economic (Jackson and Svensson, 2002). However, Lombardozzi (2017) argues that the economic dimension has not been sufficiently studied. Andreas and Wagner (2012) also identify this theoretical gap, mentioning that they could find just one study that shows (partially) the economy of an ecovillage.

Moreover, in contrast to businesses, the ecovillage’s economic activities tend to focus upon generating community resilience rather than generating income[3]. This can create some difficulties that might paradoxically debilitate community resilience. Especially considering that on the one hand, some ecovillage initiatives depend heavily on owning enough personal assets that bring the security needed for living in a simpler, low-consumption lifestyle (Jackson, 2009) – but on the other hand, most ecological-communities struggle financially (Ludwig, 2017).

Therefore, identifying the proper academic discipline and concepts that explain ecovillages’ dynamics is important. Otherwise they could be judged and analysed according to values and purposes with which they do not identify. In this sense, it may be relevant to understand the general worldview and livelihood options of ecovillagers, and in which economic approach they better fit in, in order to clarify the communal resilience concept.

Findhorn Ecovillage (FE), situated in the highlands of Scotland, has been commonly known as “the mother of all ecovillages” (Meltzer, 2018, p.25). In 1995, the terms ecovillage and Global Ecovillage Network (GEN) were coined in a Findhorn Foundation (FF) meeting (Lombardozzi, 2017). Besides its protagonist role in the ecovillage movement, FE has remained since its foundation in the 1960s as one of the most long-lived ecological communities in existence.  Therefore, its experience makes it one of the most resilient ecovillages in the world.  This becomes suitable for the purposes of this study, as will be understood in the following section.




[1] Steady state economy is a “dynamic society in which quantitative growth is replace by qualitative social development and whose rates of resource extraction and pollution are compatible with the rates of resource production and waste assimilation by supporting ecosystems” (Rees, 2003).

[2] Natural capital refers to natural resources, both non-renewable and renewable (Gowdy, 2014).
[3] Melissa Godbeer (Research Director, Findhorn College), email message to the author, April 26, 2019.

List of Contents, Figures and Tables




CREATED CONCEPTS:


COMMUNITY RESILIENCE:

Community resilience could be understood as the social and institutional[1] capacities to adapt, resist or avoid external shocks that threaten the economic and ontological security of community members.




[1] Institutional concept is preferred here instead of governmental or state ones. There is a branch that understood ecovillages as an anarchist movement (Dawson, 2006). In the latter sense, institutional could be applied in a different way, like the political capital of decision-making staff in contrast to “grassroot” social capital. This should avoid restrictions in the use of the definition.





Paper "Toward a New Community Resilience Understanding: The Findhorn Ecovillage Case"

Here I share with you my paper published by the "Sustainable Communities Review" academic journal (Volume 14, Issue 1 [2021]), in ...